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Introduction
The research on corruption has had some history in Croatia (Budak, 2006), 
especially since 1990 when the post-communist transition started. It suggests 
that there is a widespread public belief that corruption can be found almost 
everywhere in the society – from the top, to the bottom. Fragmentary research 
data and anecdotal evidence also suggest that the tolerance towards petty or 
low-level corruption (“favour for favour”, “service for service”, the habit of 
handing out small gifts to public servants, etc.) is much higher than towards 
high-level corruption, which has recently been tackled by the State Office for 
Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (Kufrin et al., 2008).
The FP6 project “Crime as Culture”, focused on the perception of cor-
ruption in seven European countries (including Croatia), started in 2006. It 
has been coordinated by a Consortium of several research institutions and 
consists of three distinct phases. In the first, research methodology was de-
veloped and applied to materials related to two chosen cases of corruption 
(a low-level and a high-level corruption case) in each of the participating 
countries. The method used was the grounded theory approach that focused 
on discovering various patterns of corruption perception within expert elit-
es. In Croatia, the two cases analyzed were: (a) financial issues associated 
with the last presidential campaign and (b) alleged corruption in the city of 
Zagreb homes for the elderly (Štulhofer et al., 2007).
In the second phase, the same methodological approach was used to 
interview the representatives of six major expert groups (police, economy, 
legal system, politics, the media, and the civic sector). Selection of inter-
viewees was based on two principal criteria: (a) a high position within the 
institutional hierarchy and (b) some professional experience with corrup-
tion-related issues.
The interviews covered a range of topics, such as: personal definition 
of corruption, assessment of corruption in Croatia and of the new anti-
corruption strategy launched in 2006, the role of the EU and NGOs in 
combating corruption in Croatia, the treatment of corruption in the media, 
assessment of the public perception of corruption, the role of cultural/politi-
cal heritage in the dynamics of corruption, and the dynamics of corruption 
prevention in the interviewee’s working environment. The research mate-
rial, collected during the March-May 2006 period, was coded and analyzed 
to discover the existing patterns of understanding corruption within the tar-
get expert groups.
Comparisons between the target groups were carried out on the basis 
of the following categories: (a) definition of corruption; (b) seriousness of 
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corruption in Croatia; (c) main loci of corruption; (d) dynamics of cor-
ruption; (e) roots/causes of corruption; (f) consequences of corruption; (g) 
public perception of corruption; (h) corruption and trust in institutions; (i) 
the role of the media; (j) the role of NGOs; (k) measures for combat-
ing the corruption; (l) the role of the EU; and (m) internal anti-corruption 
mechanisms. This second project phase resulted in empirical verification 
of the six ideal types of understanding corruption among Croatian experts: 
the Public Relations Model, characterized by simplified, often populist and 
one-dimensional definitions of corruption, the Expert Model, that entails 
complex and comprehensive assessment of corruption, the Nuisance Model, 
characterized by the lack of clear definition and anti-corruption ambitions, 
the Human Rights Model, which offers a comprehensive approach to fight-
ing corruption, the Pragmatic Model, based on comprehensive legal-politi-
cal definitions and political constraints in fighting corruption, and, finally, 
the Ignoring Model (Štulhofer et al., 2007).
According to the analysis (Kufrin et al., 2008), the understanding of 
the mechanisms that facilitate corruption in Croatia seems to be rather 
high among the interviewed experts. Different mechanisms and generators 
were clearly described, most notably political clientelism and state capture 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000), deeply rooted socio-cultural norms 
(local, kinship or politically-based social networks and the system of tradi-
tional obligations), and insufficiently professionalized and underpaid public 
administration.
In this paper, which presents the final project phase, we outline some 
policy-oriented insights based on a synthesis of the earlier project activi-
ties and the round table discussions with a group of experts.1 After a brief 
methodological section, the analytical part of the paper is divided into 
four sections, each focusing on one of the major dimensions in combating 
corruption, which has become a crucial point in Croatian accession to the 
EU: (1) research on corruption, (2) sanctioning corruption, (3) prevent-
ing corruption, and (4) increasing anti-corruption awareness. This brief 
analysis should not be mistaken for a set of policy recommendations. Our 
ambitions were much more modest and limited by the empirical data at 
our disposal. The aim was to provide some coherent and evidence-based 
material for a focused and realistic discussion on the major anti-corrup-
tion activities that should be carried out in Croatia in the next 12 to 18 
months.
1 The round table discussion session was held on 6 May 2008 at the Faculty of Humani-
ties and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb. The authors would like to thank all the 
participants for their invaluable input and support.
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1. Methodology
In the interviews with the representatives of expert groups carried out in 
the second project phase, combating corruption figured as the prominent 
issue. Experts were asked to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
second national anti-corruption strategy and its likely effects, comment on 
the mechanisms for fighting corruption in their professional environment, 
evaluate the role of various actors involved in combating corruption, and 
suggest appropriate anti-corruption activities and measures.
In the analysis of the interview transcripts, various codes attached to 
particular statements concerning the fight against corruption were pooled in 
a family of "fight against corruption" codes. For the purpose of this paper, 
all the citations connected to any of the codes in this family have been ex-
tracted and re-examined in the search for proposed activities and measures. 
The procedure has resulted in almost 150 expert citations referring to vari-
ous measures or activities. However, the list was very redundant: similar 
measures and activities were proposed in most interviews. Identical propos-
als and issues were often stated at various levels of generality or at different 
points during the interview. The observed redundancy was reduced through 
joining similar proposals under the same, more general heading. The reduc-
tion of the list was done independently by two researchers, and resulted in 
practically identical lists containing, approximately, a dozen items. Further 
analysis has suggested that additional generalization would be possible by 
distinguishing between the following general groups of activities:
(1) Research on corruption
(2) Prosecuting and penalizing corruption
(3) Prevention of corruption
(4) Strengthening anti-corruption awareness.
During the brainstorming round table with experts (May 2008), the di-
gested list of activities (expanded with typical measures; cf. Appendix) was 
discussed and the relevance, contextual strengths and weaknesses, and costs 
and benefits of the proposed activities assessed in a free flowing exchange 
of ideas. Unlike in the interviews, where it was only implicitly present, the 
issue of general political will for fighting corruption was strongly empha-
sized in the round table discussion. All the discussants agreed that political 
will constitutes the crucial prerequisite for efficient combat of corruption. 
It was suggested that even the already existing measures could consider-
ably curb corruption if supported by genuine political motivation. Most 
discussants expressed deep disbelief in the existence of readiness to fight 
corruption among members of the ruling political elite.
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2. Research on Corruption
Research on corruption is an essential element of an efficient anti-corrup-
tion strategy. However, since corrupt practices occur in the “grey area” of 
social behaviour – which makes measuring the real extent of corruption 
impossible – the research on corruption is often illustrative and indicative 
at best. The indirect approach to measuring corruption (via its perception) 
prevails and, although it remains open to criticism, it is usually assumed 
that perception of corruption is an approximate indicator of the real level 
of corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999). Such an indirect approach remains less 
valid for assessing corruption at any particular point in time than for ana-
lyzing the dynamics of corruption over time. Hence the importance of lon-
gitudinal research studies.
2.1. Assessing the Perception of Corruption
So far, Croatia has been included in a number of research studies on the 
perception of corruption, both at local and international levels. Corrupt be-
haviour among civil servants was assessed in 1995 as part of the World 
Value Survey, in 1996 (the Croatian Social Capital Study), in 1999 (the Eu-
ropean Value Study), and again in 2003, as part of the South East European 
Social Survey (Štulhofer, 2004; Kufrin et al., 2008). The results pointed to 
an increase in perception of corruption among civil servants. Yet, in 2006, 
Croatia was participating for the first time in the International Social Sur-
vey Programme (ISSP), which included a couple of relevant questions. The 
new and still unpublished results suggested a slight decrease in perception 
of corruption.
Although the aforementioned studies provide interesting data, they 
do not constitute systematic monitoring. What comes closest to it are two 
annual international studies conducted by Transparency International (the 
Corruption Perceptions Index /CPI/ and the Global Corruption Barometer 
/the Barometer/). CPI is a composite index based on expert assessments 
and the Barometer is a public-opinion survey. Croatian CPI for the year 
2007 (4.1) indicated improvement.2 It is the best Croatian score since the 
beginning of this survey in 1999, when the corresponding value was 2.7. 
Again, this put an end to the negative trend which lasted from 2001. Both 
the ISSP and CPI scores may reflect a recent more active and successful 
role of the State Attorney’s Office for Combating Corruption and Organ-
ized Crime (USKOK) and the increased media interest in the coverage of 
2 CPI score ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates a highly corrupt society and 10 a 
corruption-free society.
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corruption cases. Notably, the latest available Barometer data suggest that 
the judiciary, health care system, private-sector business, political parties 
and the Parliament/legislature are perceived as the most corrupt sectors/
institutions of the Croatian society (Transparency International – Croatia, 
2007).
2.2. Conceptualizing the Term
In order successfully to investigate and explain corrupt practices and their 
societal perceptions, one needs to be aware of certain conceptual specifici-
ties of the term corruption. It is important to go beyond the strictly legal 
definition and compare it with more informal, socially connoted everyday 
meanings. While there are some practices and acts most ordinary people 
would agree on in naming corruption, such as bribery, paying for legally 
available service, extortion, etc., there may be some cases of (legally) pun-
ishable acts that people do not consider corruption, or vice versa. These 
may include various forms of conflict of interest that are traditionally ab-
sent from collective consciousness (lack of understanding) or some practices 
that citizens do not perceive as corrupt, since they are habitual (legitimized 
by tradition). Although no relevant systematic data exist in Croatia, there 
seems to be a substantial difference in understanding – and the willingness 
to justify – high- vs. low-level corruption, as shown in Romania (Uslaner, 
2008). None of these important and culture-dependent nuances are covered 
by the present research. A better understanding of the cultural impact on the 
conceptualization of corruption remains, therefore, a crucial task.
2.3. Cultural vs. Rational Tolerance of Corruption
A differential tolerance of corruption among citizens is associated with 
specific social constraints on committing corruption. It would be wrong 
to ascribe the differential treatment of corruption solely to monitoring and 
sanctioning capacities. As Moreno argued, “corruption has a cultural side, 
and most societies have a certain degree of corruption permissiveness, with 
some of them being, on average, more likely to justify corrupt practices 
than others” (Moreno, 2002: 496). It is highly likely that some corrupt 
practices in Croatia are culturally acceptable due to certain traditional (in-
formal) norms and regulations. For example, it can be often heard that the 
gift-giving practice does not constitute bribery, but simply expresses grati-
tude (which might pave the way for a future exchange of favours). Yet, it 
is important to differentiate between the social acceptance or willingness to 
tolerate some forms of corruption and a rational decision to do so because 
it seems to be either the easiest or most beneficial option. In that respect, 
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not all corruption tolerance is culture-specific. Actually, a large part may be 
the result of a cost-benefit strategy.3 Thus, corruption can breed tolerance, 
which allows for the persistence of corruption.
Although it is probably true that corruption can never be completely 
eradicated, it is important to take into consideration both habitual and cost-
benefit sources of tolerance toward corrupt acts in combating corruption. 
Unfortunately, the existing body of research does not offer any systematic 
insight into the socio-cultural roots of corruption and its tolerance in Croatia. 
No empirical data is available on a more rational (i.e. less norm-oriented), 
cost-benefit rationale for tolerating corruption, either. This emphasizes the 
importance of designing and initiating qualitative studies focused on the 
everyday phenomenology of corruption.
2.4. Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Activities and Measures
In order to improve existing and future anti-corruption activities and meas-
ures, high-quality research evaluation is needed. Successful public policies 
are usually based on the analysis of preceding attempts. Up to now, the 
Croatian Government has adopted two National anti-corruption programmes 
(in 2002 and 2006). Unfortunately, no evaluation was carried out following 
the introduction of these programmes and related action plans (2006). This 
could suggest that the main aim was window-dressing or appeasing the EU, 
which has repeatedly insisted that curbing corruption is one of the central 
prerequisites for Croatian accession.
In May of 2008, newspapers reported that the Minister of Justice had 
announced the finalization of the new Anti-corruption Strategy. The docu-
ment should contain the first systematic analysis – though not an empirical 
evaluation – of the former National Programme. It was also announced that 
the corresponding Action Plan, which will be annually revised and updated, 
will strictly monitor the implementation progress.
Significantly, it was also suggested that the new Strategy would pay 
special attention to the measures aimed at combating high-level corruption. 
As Nieuwbeerta, De Geest and Siegers (2003: 140) emphasize, “there are 
several arguments for the view that street-level corruption is different in 
nature, requires different anti-corruption strategies, and is less harmful to 
the economic system than high-level corruption”. However, it is also a fact 
that the renewed EU pressure focused on high-level corruption, rather than 
its street-level forms. The new strategy emphasis on high-level corruption 
3 As in the situation where citizens can not legally obtain certain services to which they 
are entitled.
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was not met by more detailed and stringent regulation of conflict of interest 
and public servants’ property cards.
Traditionally, newly introduced public policies in Croatia are not con-
sidered as social experiments. This is a serious and systematic flaw in the 
process of policy development and implementation, which needs to be 
corrected. All new policies need to be regularly evaluated and, if needed, 
retracted or revised according to evidence. In the light of the suboptimal 
effects of previous anti-corruption strategies, such an approach is a neces-
sity – particularly in the context of combating corruption.
3. Prosecuting and Penalizing Corruption
While curbing corruption remains the required condition for Croatia’s 
EU membership, the actual struggle against corruption still lacks a clear 
strategy and systematic approach. It is often suggested that serious anti-
corruption activities are impossible without far-reaching institutional re-
forms and thorough de-politicization. For, as the argument goes, as long 
as the heads of hospital departments and universities or members of the 
supervisory boards of large companies are appointed on the basis of their 
political allegiances, any serious attempt at curbing high-level corruption 
is largely doomed.
One of the interesting, but predictable, differences between low- and 
high-level corruption is that the former – even though present in the media 
as often as the high-level corruption cases – are more likely to be prose-
cuted. Apart from the fact that it is less likely that it will be permitted to 
prosecute high-level corruption, there is an overall problem with finding 
evidence sufficient for prosecution and, eventually, for penalization. Among 
other things, this calls into question both the appropriateness of the legal 
framework and the judicial expertise and impartiality.
Although it is probably true that the number of reported corruptive acts 
in Croatia, as well as internationally, remains insignificant in comparison to 
the real extent of corruption (Kregar, 2003), an increase in the number of 
prosecuted corruptive acts and strict sanctioning are among central charac-
teristics of an efficient anti-corruption policy.
Data presented in Table 1 confirm an increase in the number of re-
ported cases during the 2002–2006 period. However, the indictment and 
conviction ratios – reflecting, to a certain degree, prosecutorial and judici-
ary efficacy – were higher at the beginning of the period then at its end. 
As for strict sanctioning, in 2006 only 11% of 328 convicted persons were 
actually imprisoned and most of them up to 30 days. (Others were only 
fined.)
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Table 1. Criminal Offences against Official Duty
Year Reported cases Indictments
Indictment 





ratio (% of 
indictments)
2002 1314 588 44,75 265 20,17
2003 1774 633 35,68 340 19,17
2004 1871 705 37,68 330 17,64
2005 1557 649 41,68 267 17,15
2006 1873 776 41,43 328 17,51
Source: Statistical Yearbook 2007 of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Zagreb
A vicious circle may be at work here. If reporting corruptive acts is 
mainly left to citizens, as it usually the case, a possible explanation of 
the slow increase in reported cases could be the consequence of the wide-
spread scepticism regarding the quality and impartiality of prosecutorial 
and judiciary work. In a situation where only a fraction of cases results 
in (minor) sanctions, usually after a number of years, citizens’ sense of 
justice and the importance of whistle-blowing may be weakened by the 
rising feeling of futility. This, in combination with fear – the media has 
reported about a number of cases in which the persons accused of cor-
ruptive activity were not prosecuted, but those who reported them were 
dismissed from their posts or even physically attacked – could account for 
the small number of reported cases of corruption. Only recently has a new 
amendment to the Bill on State Officials provided some legal protection 
to whistle-blowers.4
It is often forgotten that legal sanctioning of corruption represents 
only one, though probably the most notable, form of penalizing corrupt 
behaviour. Although it seems culture-specific, moral sanctioning of cor-
ruption may be an important additional deterrent. In countries with low 
tolerance toward corruption, professional and public ostracism of individu-
als involved in corrupt activities help to keep the rewards from corruption 
low and the costs high. The questions of whether, and how, such moral 
sanctioning of corruption could be strategically developed (in a country 
with rather high levels of tolerance toward corruption) remains open, but 
is seems likely that a campaign that would re-frame this moral imperative 
as an issue of national pride would require substantial de-politicization and 
4 The Bill ensures the whistle-blower is legally protected if sufficient evidence against the 
accused is found. If not, the former could be fired and even legally prosecuted.
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high levels of trust in the government and in state institutions. This seems 
highly improbable in a country where no high-positioned civil servant has 
ever resigned after he/she had been confronted with allegations of corrup-
tion. This problem is exacerbated by the existing state capture tendencies, 
which remain officially unquestioned in spite of frequent proclamations of 
the “political will to combat corruption”.
This formalism was reflected in the recently amended Bill on the Pre-
vention of Conflict of Interest in the Execution of Public Duties. Amend-
ments were introduced to extend the list of public servants who would be 
under the jurisdiction of the Bill, and to specify their obligations. Two ma-
jor flaws remained. Firstly, members of various political parties will con-
tinue to constitute over 50% of the Parliamentary Committee on Conflict 
of Interest, the main monitoring body. Secondly, the sanctions prescribed 
by the Bill for norm violation are either unclear or marginal.
4. Prevention of Corruption
Corruption prevention is the core element of any comprehensive anti-cor-
ruption strategy. In this brief section we focus on the activities and meas-
ures aimed at preventing corruption that were suggested in interviews with 
experts from the six target groups, carried out during the second project 
phase and/or discussed at the recently organized round table (cf. Introduc-
tion). Behind the activities mentioned, there was a general assumption of an 
existing political will to curb corruption. Clearly, the success of any anti-
corruption strategy is determined, initially at least, by the decision-makers’ 
support and commitment.
A simple classification of anti-corruption activities should distinguish 
between: (a) activities that make corruption more difficult or costly, and 
(b) activities that diminish rewards and returns from corrupt acts. The first 
category includes activities such as simplification of the legal framework 
(for example, overly complex procedures of public procurement), improv-
ing decision-making transparency – especially if economic transactions are 
involved or implied – increasing legal sanctions for corruption, and citi-
zens’ education. All these activities can have a direct and immediate effect 
on both low- and high-level corruption.
The second category describes activities that improve the availability 
and quality of public services (e-administration, etc.), as well as decen-
tralization and professionalization of decision-making, better professional 
education, competitive (meritocratic) employment in public administration, 
and eradication of various state capture opportunities through systematic 
liberalization and de-politicization (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). 
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At least in regard to low-level corruption, reducing the necessity for cor-
ruption decreases its utility.
Both types of activities would be best applied in combination, starting 
from the areas where the contact between citizens and state administration 
is the most intensive. By effectively signalling that corruption is no longer 
tolerated, such an approach could, in turn, provide an impetus for the afore-
mentioned moral sanctioning of corruption.
4.1. Obstacles
Attempts at corruption prevention are often confronted with different obsta-
cles, from inefficient or corrupt judiciary to undermining political networks. 
In general, the less developed the democracy, particularly in regard to civil 
liberties, the more obstacles to preventing corruption. If a journalist pub-
lishes an article exposing a case of corruption and subsequently loses his/
her job, this has no beneficial effect on corruption prevention, but it does 
make the problem of corruption “visible”. But if journalists are prevented 
from publishing a story – by being threatened with termination of their 
contracts – the problem may not be “visible” at all. Other types of obsta-
cle are informal networks of power, which provide excellent conditions 
for “invisible” corruption. Such groups, especially if unchecked, can easily 
arrange various deals far from the public eye and sheltered from official 
investigations. A system of mutual obligations usually ensures the longevity 
of such corruption-prone networks.
Overcoming the obstacles is most often a gradual process based on 
citizens’ education, strengthening of civil society, improving democratic 
institutions and procedures, and increasing information flow. In that sense, 
corruption prevention can be a slow process that depends both on the more 
general democratic progress and the results of the more specific anti-cor-
ruption activities.
5. Anti-Corruption Awareness
There is a general understanding that increasing anti-corruption aware-
ness (ACA) is an essential element of any effective anti-corruption strat-
egy (Uslaner, 2008). However, it is not always clear what is meant by 
ACA – for example, whether it encompasses a deeper understanding of 
the social ills of corruption or just a general moral condemnation of cor-
ruption – and what measures could be efficiently used to strengthen it. 
During our interviews and discussions with experts, it was often suggested 
that the evolution of ACA is a long-term process dependent on many fac-
tors. Central among them seem to be the functionality of the legal system, 
Ognjen Čaldarović et al.: Combating Corruption in Croatia, Revija za sociologiju 40[39] (2009), 1-2: 3–22
14
the quality and persistency of media reporting on corruption, the existing 
political culture, the level of development of civil society, and the general 
educational level.
Turning to ACA-beneficial activities, the success in prosecuting indi-
viduals involved in corruption scandals seems particularly important. Dis-
closure of high-level corruption cases and the display of readiness to pros-
ecute and penalize individuals, especially officials, play a significant role in 
raising ACA. Since such legal cases can take years to finalize, immediate 
steps – such as the introduction of better control mechanisms in the state 
institutions where corruption has been found – would be necessary to send 
the message that corruption will not be tolerated. In addition, resignation 
of supervising officials should be made mandatory in order to make anti-
corruption vigilance a personal responsibility.
Media coverage of the above described activities is crucial. The activi-
ties undertaken after a corruption scandal has erupted need to be presented 
in detail and carefully scrutinized. Only the systematic and critical coverage 
of corruption (and the state response) could increase ACA. Obviously, this 
task requires skilled journalists, socially responsible editors, and, generally, 
“clean” media. In several interviews with experts, the media in Croatia 
were implied to be part of the clientelist networks.
Anti-corruption awareness is closely related to corruption prevention. 
In that respect, most prevention activities will have an effect on ACA, al-
though with different reach. Too often the prevention and ACA are equated 
with educating the public about what corruption is and why is it bad for the 
society. Although the importance of understanding the scope and forms of 
corruption can hardly be overstated, educational campaigns require palpable 
changes in the corruption-related incentive structure. Without a publicly 
recognizable process of lowering the rewards and increasing the costs of 
corruption already set in motion, informing people about the ills of corrup-
tion will only contribute to rising cynicism.
In the Croatian context, when it comes to politicians and entrepreneurs, 
the ACA context depends on the reforms that tackle the mechanisms of 
state capture. This could prove difficult, since links to political power have 
become essential business tools for some companies. A good example is the 
recent physical attack (ominous baseball bats were used by the attackers) 
on a newly appointed CEO in the huge and largely monopolistic holding 
company of the city of Zagreb, who reported to the State Attorney’s Of-
fice for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) a number 
of irregularities that took place in the company before his appointment. 
Interestingly, the city mayor and his deputy, who publicly expressed their 
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support for the attacked official, failed to mention the alleged corruption 
activities at the city company as a possible reason for the attack.
Another important question regarding ACA is related to the low- vs. 
high-level corruption distinction. Should the strengthening of ACA include 
both equally? Or do we need to focus ACA primarily on the latter form? 
Although it could be argued that, historically, the two types of corruption 
probably evolved in parallel in the region, mutually reinforcing each other, 
the rationality behind the low-level corruption (inefficient public adminis-
tration, non-transparent and non-competitive employment procedures etc.) 
clearly differs from the one associated with high-level corruption (greed, 
political power acquisition). Also, low- and high-level corruption implies 
rather different social costs.
Although the question remains open – to our knowledge, there is no 
consensus regarding this issue – we believe that to insist on absolute ACA, 
characterized by moral abhorrence of any type of corruption, would be 
neither feasible, nor useful. The useful approach, in our view, would be to 
foster ACA primarily focused on the high-level corruption, which would 
provide much needed public pressure on the decision-makers. An additional 
argument takes into consideration an asymmetric relationship between low- 
and high-level corruption. While changes in the dynamics of low-level cor-
ruption may not affect the dynamics of high-level corruption, the spillover 
effect is often found in the reverse case (Uslaner, 2008).5
If ACA is conceptualized as suggested, systematic education on what 
constitutes corruption should be carried out on a large scale. The notion 
and scope of the conflict of interest is poorly understood among Croatian 
citizens, this being partly related to traditional emphasis on kinship and 
loyalty to the local community. A narrow interpretation of the conflict of 
interest at all levels equates this type of corruption to either illegal transfer 
of money or valuables (bribes), or political favours (getting a better job, 
etc.). Improving understanding and recognition of corruption in the cases 
where no money or immediate privileges are involved would emphasize 
and broaden the individual responsibility of politicians and administrators. 
This would, in turn, increase public pressure on individuals in charge who 
have refused to resign after serious misconduct has been discovered in their 
institutions.
If anti-corruption awareness is understood as a pattern of behaviour 
– characterized by the readiness to reject and report any kind of corrupt 
5 “Whenever corruption shapes people's evaluation of their state or their society, it is high-
level corruption. The misdeeds of ordinary professionals don't matter” (Uslaner, 2008: 
133).
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activity – rather than a moral disposition, one of the main obstacles to 
strengthening ACA is the widespread perception of powerlessness. This 
dominant socio-cultural characteristic of post-communist societies has been 
highlighted in a number of research studies (Mishler and Rose, 1997; Fuchs 
and Klingemann, 2002; Paldan and Svendsen, 2001). Lack of trust in in-
stitutions and weak civic ties helps to explain why many individuals who 
are confronted with corruption they do not condone are unwilling to report 
it. As reporting criminal activity involves a certain level of personal risk 
and considerable time expenditure, perceiving such engagement as useless 
would minimize its occurrence, no matter how strong the personal anti-
corruption convictions.
6. Back to Perception(s)
The findings of the two empirical phases of this project (2006–2007; 
Štulhofer et al., 2007; Kufrin et al., 2008) suggest three main dimensions of 
expert perceptions of the phenomenology of corruption in Croatia. The first 
was the frequently encountered disbelief in the existence of genuine politi-
cal will to fight corruption. Governmental campaigns and proclamations, 
as well as national strategies, were often dismissed as window-dressing 
intended for the EU decision-makers. In addition, anti-corruption activities 
and efforts were frequently perceived as misguided, i.e., focused on the 
low-level corruption and ignoring or carefully avoiding political corrup-
tion.6 Representatives of the media and civil society were most vocal in 
expressing this viewpoint. As expected, the most consistent confidence in 
the national anti-corruption strategy was observed among the representa-
tives of the police and the legal system.
The second dimension was the perception of cultural generators of 
corruption. In most expert groups we found numerous references to the 
socio-cultural history of corruption. It was pointed out that corruption in 
Croatia – i.e. its local “language” (cf. Shore and Haller, 2005) – can not 
be properly understood without taking into account the cultural legacy of 
the former socialist regime: persistence of traditional nepotism, loyalty to 
the local community, reliance of personal networks and mutual obligations, 
etc. The transitional context of the 1990s, characterized by the 1991–1995 
armed conflict, rapid privatization, increasing inequality, and the authoritar-
ian political clientelism, was mentioned even more frequently. Both periods 
6 A good example was the recent discussion at the National Board for Monitoring of the 
Programme of Curbing Corruption, held on 29 June 2008, where several journalist ac-
cused the government of sabotaging anti-corruption efforts – either directly or indirectly 
– through influencing or pressuring the media (Majdandžić, 2008).
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were seen by experts as crucial for moulding specific cultural habits and 
structural factors that reproduce corruption on different societal levels.
The third characteristic was the hyperopic (mis)perception of cor-
ruption (HMC), which was indicated in our interviews when discussing 
internal mechanisms for fighting corruption (in-house anti-corruption ac-
tivity). The phrase, as we recently suggested (Kufrin et al., 2008), denotes 
a phenomenon where actors are critical of corruption in other sectors or 
groups, but tend to ignore or mislabel corrupt acts within their own insti-
tution or social group. There are several possible explanations for HMC. 
It is possible that such a dual approach to corruption represents a cultural 
habit developed under the past circumstances and social practices. Alter-
natively, it could be based on inadequate understanding of what consti-
tutes corruption, especially in regard to conflict of interest and the abuse 
of public office.7 Another possibility is that HMC is the consequence of 
a strategic action of protecting one’s reputation – and the reputation of 
one’s institution – by covering up the corrupt behaviour of one’s close 
associates. (The prevalence of such strategy would depend on the costs of 
corruption, which are closely related with the efficiency of legal protec-
tion against corrupt acts.) Unfortunately, the data collected in our study 
proved insufficient for pinpointing the cause(s) of HMC. What seems 
clear, though, is that the social embeddedness of corruption in Croatia 
includes a differential perception, and, most probably, evaluation of cor-
ruption, which is dependent on social proximity with the implied actors. 
It should be noted that HMC was least present in the media and civil 
society expert groups.
These three overarching characteristics of expert perceptions of corrup-
tion should not be confused with the six models outlined earlier (Štulhofer 
et al., 2007). Those are more complex entities that are, at least partially, 
group-specific. It is important to note that the observed heterogeneity and 
fragmentariness of the models could be an obstacle, particularly for an 
efficient coordination of the fight against corruption. The Expert and the 
Pragmatic Model were found to be predominant in defining corruption and 
discussions regarding efficient anti-corruption activities. An alternative ap-
proach to conceptualizing corruption (the Human Rights Model) was spe-
7 There is abundant evidence in the media reports that many public servants, government 
officials, and members of the Parliament have incomplete understanding of the notion of 
conflict of interest or abuse of power. This is usually displayed in the discussions over 
personal responsibility related to institutional mismanagement, as in the recent case of un-
lawful forced confinement to a psychiatric institution, to which the wife of an influential 
media mogul was subjected, allegedly atupon his request (Škaričić and Babić, 2008).
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cific to civil society and, to a certain extent, to the media target group. As 
already mentioned, in most target groups it was the Ignoring Model that 
characterized experts’ understanding of the importance of internal mecha-
nisms of control and prevention of corruption.
In general, the most critical target group, NGO representatives, was 
marginalized in the majority of other experts’ discourses, particularly in 
regard to the role civil society plays in fighting corruption. Partially, such 
treatment is associated with the legacy of socialism and its politically moti-
vated distrust toward non-governmental associations and civic engagement. 
However, an additional reason seems to be the annoyance (palpable in gov-
ernmental institutions) over constant criticism coming from civil society, 
which is often perceived as not based on evidence, as well as being self-
promoting. Such accusations can, of course, serve as a perfect alibi for 
doing nothing to prevent and/or curb corruption. In this sense, the reality 
of the economic and social costs of fighting corruption may be tactically 
inflated and used as an argument against any systematic and committed 
approach to combating corruption.
Although the discussions about corruption as a social problem have 
been part of Croatian public life since the mid-1990s, initiated primarily 
by the media and civil society, its political significance and, consequently, 
policy ramifications have been markedly strengthened since 2000, mostly 
due to the EU conditions and expectations expressed in negotiations over 
the accession process. Thus, the EU role in the anti-corruption discourse 
and activities in Croatia can hardly be overemphasized. Its perception, 
however, among the interviewed experts seemed vague and ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the pressure to adopt new political and professional norms 
and standards of conduct, together with legal and institutional reforms re-
lated to the accession process, were often stressed as positive influences. 
Socio-cultural “resilience”, on the other hand, or the perceived ability to 
continue with “business as usual” in spite of being closely monitored by 
the EU, was sometimes expressed in the belief that the success – or, for 
that matter, failure – of anti-corruption efforts is entirely an internal issue, 
associated primarily with the moral and professional quality of governance. 
This moderate to minor anti-corruption role of the EU, according to most 
experts who participated in our study, seems to be in line with a rather 
sceptical public view of the benefits of joining the EU. In June 2008, the 
Standard Eurobarometer 69 survey revealed that only 30% of Croatian citi-
zens believe that Croatian membership in the EU would be “a good thing”. 
In 30 countries included in the survey, only Latvia had a lower proportion 
of Euro-optimists (European Commission, 2008).
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Conclusion
In this paper we further analyzed qualitative material collected during the 
2006–2007 period. Based on interviews with experts from the six target 
groups and the subsequent round table discussion, we outlined policy-ori-
ented suggestions and their social context. We argued that the social em-
beddedness of expert suggestions needs to be understood in terms of the 
dominant pattern of corruption perception. The observed heterogeneity and 
fragmentariness of the existing, and competing, patterns of corruption per-
ception are a potential obstacle to coordinated and efficient anti-corruption 
activities – especially if a widespread disbelief in the existence of political 
will to combat corruption and the hyperopic (mis)perception of corruption 
are taken into account.
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APPENDIX – The List of Anti-Corruption Activities Suggested by 
Interviewed Experts
(A) Strengthening Anti-Corruption Awareness
•  Clear and convincing demonstration of the determination (i.e. political 
will) to fight corruption;
•  Systematic public presentation of the efficient identification and prosecution 
of major corruption cases;
•  Focusing on high-level corruption;
•  Comprehensive and systematic anti-corruption education of citizens 
(including information on citizens’ rights, procedures for reporting 
corruption, legal protection for whistle-blowers, etc) aimed at increasing 
public sensitivity (and intolerance) to corruption;
•  Re-framing the fight against corruption as the national imperative and a 
matter of national pride;
•  Strengthening the role of the media through the promotion and nurturing of 
investigative journalism and protection of journalists’ freedom of reporting 
and independence from the ownership structure;
•  Focusing on corruption during election campaigns (NGOs, political parties, 
the media).
(B) Prevention of Corruption
•  Increasing the efficiency and transparency of public services;
•  Selective increase of salaries in certain public services;
•  Allowing for private competitors in the public service sector;
•  Strengthening financial control (property cards for officials, eliminating 
cash payments, systematic internal control and revision, requisition of 
unlawfully acquired property, etc.);
•  Strengthening the position and influence of the civil sector.
(C) Prosecuting and Penalizing Corruption
•  The need for legislative changes, including simplification of regulation, 
higher penalties for corrupt acts, and more comprehensive laws on the 
financing of political parties and election campaigns;
•  Improving the quality of the judiciary (increasing efficacy and quality 
control, improving the process of selecting judges, etc.);
•  Implementing the positive experiences of the EU.
(D) Research on Corruption
•  The need for an independent institution responsible for systematic research 
on corruption;
•  Evidence-based surveillance of the public perception and understanding 
of corruption;
•  Empirical evaluation of anti-corruption policy (activities and measures 
associated with the National Strategy).
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Suzbijanje korupcije u Hrvatskoj: od stručnih 
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U radu se predstavlja komparativna analiza različitih percepcija korupcije u Hrvat-
skoj. Rad se temelji na interpretaciji istraživačkih rezultata prikupljenih u okviru 
FP6 projekta »Crime as Culture«, započetog 2006. godine i posvećenog analizi 
percepcije korupcije u sedam europskih zemalja. Za organizaciju i interpretaciju 
podataka dobivenih u intervjuima sa stručnjacima iz šest područja korištena je 
metodologija utemeljene teorije. Svrha rada jest određivanje nekih javnopolitičkih 
uvida utemeljenih na sintezi nalaza projekta. Rad je podijeljen u četiri cjeline 
koje opisuju temeljne dimenzije borbe protiv korupcije: (1) istraživanje korupcije, 
(2) sankcioniranje korupcije, (3) prevencija korupcije i (4) podizanje svijesti o ko-
rupciji. Kao što analize pokazuju, društvena uklopljenost korupcije u Hrvatskoj 
dobro se odražava u dominantnim stručnim percepcijama korupcije. U studiji 
primijećene heterogenost i fragmentarnost postojećih (i često konkurirajućih) 
percepcija korupcije moguće su prepreke za sustavnu, dobro usklađenu i uspješnu 
strategiju borbe protiv korupcije.
Ključne riječi: korupcija, percepcija korupcije, mišljenja stručnjaka, društvena 
uklopljenost korupcije, Hrvatska
